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Non-technical Summary
In recent years the question whether jobs have become more insecure over the last two decades in capitalist economies has been researched extensively. Students of Western labor markets have looked at the length of continuous employment with a given firm, i.e. tenure, and how tenure has shaped worker turnover. Whether more separations have occurred at higher tenure in more recent times is then one of the questions that has been investigated by those who analyze developments in Western labor markets. We apply the issue of tenure and worker turnover to two transition economies, Poland and Russia. In transition we observe a large reallocation of labor from declining to expanding sectors and many state-owned or privatized enterprises are restructuring, with both processes leading to possibly large worker turnover. So, looking at tenure and worker turnover, which is comprised of separations and hirings, seems particularly relevant for transition countries.
In Western economies we observe an inverse relationship between tenure and separations. Another well established stylized fact is that this decline in separations accelerates with growing tenure. Firm-specific human capital theory is one of several theories that can well explain these stylized facts. The longer a worker is continuously employed in a job the higher his/her productivity and remuneration, so the less incentive there will be for a worker to search for a new job and quit and for a firm to lay off this worker. We extend the firm-specific human capital theory by introducing two sectors in an economy of transition, an "old", low productivity sector, i.e. state-owned or privatized firms that have not yet restructured, and a "new", high productivity sector, i.e. new private and restructured state-owned or privatized firms. We moot that in a transition economy separation rates can be larger at any tenure than in Western economies since firm-specific human capital in the "old" sector might have depreciated dramatically with the beginning of reforms. So, at higher tenure levels than in the West workers might find it profitable to quit and many job matches struck under the old regime might be of little value to firms. A countervailing influence on separations can be insider power. Where unions are strong or where workers own a substantial part of the privatized firm, successful resistance to layoffs can cause separations to be lower at most tenure levels than in the West. Insider resistance to layoffs can also imply that at very short tenures worker separations rates are higher, i.e. we could get a steeper tenure-separations profile than in the West.
To see whether our simple theoretical considerations are born out by the data we compare the tenure-separations profiles of Poland, Russia and Great Britain, a Western economy with one of the most flexible labor markets, using Labor Force Survey data.. We also look at tenure and separations rates separately for private and state-sector employment since some of the differences in worker turnover between the "old" and the "new" sector should be picked up with this data split.
The second aspect of worker turnover that we examine is the hiring process. Analyzing workers with short tenures gives us information about the extent of new hires and, with knowledge of firm ownership, a means of comparing labor requirements in both re-allocation and restructuring. As a working hypothesis we take the simple view that private sector hiring will be the result of labor re-allocation and new job creation, whilst the state sector will be engaged primarily in re-structuring and therefore replacement hiring. We also look for evidence that wage differentials between the private and the state sector are guiding the re-allocation of labor.
Our empirical evidence does suggest that there is an inverse tenure-turnover profile in both transition countries, which is higher in Russia than in Poland. Turnover is higher in the private sector at all tenures than in state sector firms, but turnover in the Russian state sector is
Introduction "….a sample of the confused events in those feverish days, when everyone knew that something was going to happen, but nobody knew just what"
John Reed -Ten Days that Shook the World (1926) Economic transition in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe has led to both reallocation of labor across industries and occupations and re-structuring of tasks within continuing organizations. Re-allocation involves the transfer of labor and other resources from sectors in decline, primarily state owned, to expanding, mainly privately owned, sectors. Re-structuring, on the other hand, occurs within state or privatized firms seeking to adapt and survive in the new economic environment. This requires a more efficient use of labor resources in an attempt to raise productivity. Restructuring will make some working processes obsolete and expose workers to a greater risk of job loss. Labor shedding is then viewed as one consequence of this process. At the same time, any upturn in the rate of new job creation can facilitate job quitting and even within-firm transfers of workers.
In what follows, we analyze which workers are affected by the transition process, concentrating on the effect of job tenure on worker separations and on the factors affecting new job accessions.
In one strand of the Western literature (e.g. Mincer and Jovanovic, 1981, and Farber, 1999) , the length of job tenure is associated with the intensity of firm-specific capital, which can generate an inverse but convex relationship between job separations, whether worker or firm initiated, and tenure. To what extent tenure helps determine the separation process in an economy undergoing transition, where firm-specific capital for many workers may no longer retain its value, is the first subject of this paper. We argue that if firm-specific capital has depreciated dramatically, then separations, quits and layoffs, may occur higher up the tenure distribution than in a Western economy.
However, there are other factors that may be important in explaining worker turnover in transition economies. Aghion and Blanchard (1994) and Blanchard (1997) argue that high unemployment will provoke resistance to restructuring through labor shedding in state firms or firms privatized internally. So insider power may act to moderate the rate of separations at any tenure, but also, because job tenure may be correlated with insider power, this would concentrate separations at the lower end of the tenure distribution. This could then generate a steeper tenureturnover profile than in an economy not subject to mass insider privatization or lacking strong union influence.
The second aspect of worker turnover that we examine is the hiring process. Analyzing the short end of the tenure distribution gives us information about the extent of new hires and, with knowledge of firm ownership, a means of comparing labor requirements in both re-allocation and restructuring. A simple view would be that private sector hiring will be the result of labor reallocation and new job creation, whilst the state sector will be engaged primarily in re-structuring and therefore replacement hiring.
This paper analyses the patterns of worker turnover in two transition countries, Poland and Russia, and compares these patterns to those of a benchmark Western economy, Britain, located toward the flexible end of the labor market. The two transition economies differ both in their reform stance and in their labor market experiences. In Poland, open unemployment emerged rapidly after a consistent reform program was implemented in 1990. In Russia, transition began later and has been more sporadic, but without the emergence of mass unemployment. Here, labor adjustment has occurred instead mainly on the price side, with a sharp fall in real wages and the build up of large wage arrears affecting more than half of those in work, (Lehmann, Wadsworth and Acquisti 1999) . The pace of privatization has been slower in Poland than in Russia, which may have consequences for worker turnover through some insider mechanism. In Russia, failure to index unemployment benefits to inflation and often the failure by the authorities to pay benefits make job reallocation through unemployment more unlikely than in Poland.
There were also differences in how the labor market operated under central planning in the two countries that might have a bearing on the adjustment process during transition. 1 A large legal private non-agricultural sector in Poland in the eighties competed with the state sector for labor resources. This competition ensured that there was virtually no slack in the state sector, a tendency reinforced by substantial labor hoarding in order to meet production targets and enterprise level bonuses, (Góra and Rutkowski, 1990) . In contrast, the Soviet labor market, without a legal private sector since the early thirties, had considerable slack throughout its history.
This slack manifested itself in regular open unemployment in certain regions (Malle, 1986 ) despite a public commitment to full employment and lack of unemployment benefits. Overmanning and a low utilization rate of labor resources was also widespread, (Porkett, 1989) . In Soviet times, the employment of many Russian workers may therefore have been more tenuous than that of their Polish colleagues. Porkett (1989) argues that the excess demand system and concentration on labor intensive methods of production meant that many workers in the Soviet Union were found in jobs unsuited to their qualifications, despite an assignment system that placed many graduates and specialized workers in jobs for three years. Faced with a system where unskilled labor was often in demand more highly than academic qualifications, many graduates and technicians left their allotted workplaces and moved to enterprises in search of manual workers. Fringe benefits, such as the provision of housing, or kindergartens, were important factors in the competition for workers.
Thus, not only the underutilization of labor through overmanning but also the "wrong" utilization of labor was widespread in the Soviet Union. In Poland, these features were less prevalent in the eighties, because labor market conditions were tighter.
Whilst the excess demand regimes are now gone, the old hiring and turnover patterns may persist in the early phases of transition. For example, Commander, McHale and Yemtsov (1995) have argued that fixed coefficients technology may ensure that certain groups of workers required in communist times continue to be in demand in an environment where investment in new technology is sluggish. If so, then this would distort western notions of allocating workers through rewarding recognized qualifications, instead enhancing the value of experience within a firm. Moreover this type of production process would require a given share of unskilled workers which may lead to hiring rates for certain workers above those expected in a state sector subject to a large negative shock.
In general, the more widespread, the more consistent and the longer the reform process and the shorter the experience under central planning, the less we would expect the legacy of former times to endure. Poland and Russia are at different stages of the "transition cycle". By the autumn of 1994, the Polish economy had been growing for 3 years, whilst the Russian economy was mired in transition induced recession and has continued to be so. This different position of the two economies in the transition cycle and differences in the nature of reform allow us to contrast worker turnover.
Using data from the Polish labor Force Survey, (PLFS), and The Russian Longitudinal
Monitor Survey, (RLMS), we match individuals across waves 12 months apart in order to measure the incidence of worker mobility in the years 1994 to 1995. We compare the pattern of turnover with data from Britain for the period 1996-97, when the economy was three years into a recovery. We then look in detail at new jobs, those held by a worker for less than 12 months, in an attempt to identify the principal sectors in which job growth is occurring, the main characteristics of the individuals who fill them and whether there are notable cross-country differences in the pattern of new hires. We split the data into state and private ownership in order to examine, for example, whether workers are leaving the state sector in order to obtain jobs in the private sector, whether less skilled workers are obliged to seek new jobs in the state sector, whether new private sector jobs are more unstable, whether there is any evidence that wage differentials are guiding re-allocation.
Section 2 sets out a simple model of worker turnover that may be relevant to a transition economy. We argue that the returns to seniority in jobs begun under the old order may be small and the value of a continued job match lower than in new sectors. As a result, both voluntary and involuntary turnover can occur at higher levels of the job tenure distribution than may be expected in the West. Insider resistance to restructuring could, however, dampen worker turnover.
Section 3 outlines the data sources used in the study, whilst section 4 looks at separation rates across countries and finds evidence of higher turnover at all tenures in Russia than in either Poland or Britain. Section 5 examines the pattern of new hires. Section 6 concludes to the effect that the patterns of worker turnover that we observe in Russia are consistent with the human capital destruction model, but that insider power may have prevented the same pattern from emerging in Poland.
Theoretical Considerations
How might worker turnover and job tenure be modeled in a transition economy? A simple, two-period model will suffice to illustrate our main points. Suppose that there are two job types, one in the old sector and one in the new sector, distinguished by their overall productive potential, f, and that f o < f n where f n is normalized to one. The old jobs will be primarily in state or privatized firms which have not yet re-structured and the new jobs will be found in the emerging private and transforming state and privatized sectors. Equally, this dichotomy could be applied to a comparison of a transition and a Western economy. Let the value of a job match, y, rise with firm specific human capital or seniority according to, y i (t), where i = old, (o) or new, (n).
This allows the relationship between tenure and productivity to differ in the two sectors. Hence the wage paid to the worker in either sector is given by
where W a is the fall-back wage common to both sectors and λ is the worker's share of the value of the job match. 2 Suppose voluntary job quits occur as the result of a simple comparison of the wage at tenure t and the wage in a new job with tenure zero. It follows that a worker will quit an old sector job for the new sector if
The existence of a productivity differential will ensure that job quits from old to new could occur at any tenure, but that the quit rate will decline with tenure as rewards to seniority grow. The smaller f o relative to f n or the smaller the growth rate of firm-specific capital in the old sector, y' o (t), then the more likely w(t) o < w(0) n for some t that is greater than would occur in an economy not subject to transition. Quits from the old to the new sector happen further up the tenure distribution than in a Western economy. The greater the share of the old sector, the larger the aggregate quit rate at any tenure.
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A firm will lay workers off if the wage exceeds the total value of the job match, 2. Farber (1999) uses a one-sector version of this set-up while Pissarides (1994) uses a two-sector approach in his analysis of the failure of unemployment to fall in Western economies despite economic recovery.
3. Within sector quits occur if positive random shocks to the outside wage exceed the value of the worker's share of the job match. This follows from (1). V = W a + y(t). The profit of firm i is
Following a random negative shock to the value of the worker's output, φ, that may, for example, be industry-specific, the profit of a firm falls by φ and hence the firm will lay workers off if profits become negative, that is if
i.e. if the shock is sufficiently greater than the firm's share of the value of the match. It follows that given the same shock there will be more layoffs in the old sector compared to the new sector and that layoffs will also occur further up the tenure distribution in the old sector, since
A higher, flatter tenure-turnover profile is therefore consistent with the emergence of differential productivity-tenure relations in the old and new sectors that affect both quit and layoff behavior. This is, of course, not the only model that may explain tenure-turnover profiles. Aghion and Blanchard's (1994) and Blanchard's (1997) models of restructuring, whilst saying little about tenure explicitly, could be used to invoke a story of insider resistance to restructuring, which would also generate an inverse tenure-turnover profile. According to this model, there may be more insider resistance in Poland than in Russia because unemployment is higher in the former than in the latter and because trade union influence is more prevalent in Poland in state and privatised firms, which still account for the bulk of employment. 4 We can introduce insider effects into our theoretical framework by allowing the worker's share of the job match to rise with seniority in the old sector. In this case (2) becomes
and job quits in the old sector become more concentrated at lower tenures. Hence the aggregate tenure turnover profile lies to the left of that of an economy not subject to insider resistance.
More insider power implies, of course, that firms find it harder to layoff workers with higher tenure, even though insider power will reduce the firm's share of the match value, (1-λ(t) o )y o (t)f o further and so encourage layoffs higher up the tenure distribution following a negative shock.
There may also be features unique to a transition economy that help explain the dynamics of worker turnover. There is, for example, an implicit assumption above that firms face a hard budget constraint. Whilst this may be true in Poland, the evidence for Russia shows that certain sectors of the economy enjoyed soft budget constraints in our sample period. Polish state firms had to impose hiring freezes because of the hardening of the budget constraint (Konings, Lehmann and Schaffer, 1996) , whilst in Russia we observe relatively large hirings by state firms that might be related to the endurance of soft budget constraints.
It is also possible to envisage a re-working of the experience good theory of turnover of Jovanovic (1979) . If new information about the quality of the match arrives, generated by the transition process, then a separation could occur at any tenure. There may also be elements of experience good job shopping in the new jobs emerging from the transition process. This learning process may take longer because of unfamiliarity with the new labor market environment and rules. Running counter to these influences, separations may be caused by the intrinsic weakness of the emerging private sector, especially in the early phase of transition. Greater uncertainty and lack of infrastructure may destroy many new job matches soon after their inception. 5 Moreover a fixed coefficient technology may require old, unrestructured firms to hire labor relevant to the old means of production.
In truth, the observed tenure-turnover profile will contain elements of all these factors. We therefore proceed to examine whether there is any evidence that worker turnover patterns are consistent with the arguments set out here.
Data
For Russia, we use the second phase of the RLMS, a longitudinal panel of around 4000
households across the Russian federation conducted in the autumn of 1994, 1995 and 1996 . The data contains a set of demographic and establishment characteristics, together with information on the labor market activities of its sample. Despite its relatively small size, the advantage of this source for our purposes, is that we can track individuals and the incidence of worker turnover over time. We treat each wave as a separate cross section and restrict the matched sample to those present for two consecutive waves.
The data for Poland are drawn from 3 waves of the PLFS, a quarterly survey of around 30,000 households begun in May 1992. Job tenure information was included from May 1994. The data have a panel element. There is an approximate 50% overlap between surveys one year apart.
To eliminate seasonal effects in our cross-country comparisons we use the autumn waves for the years 1994, 1995 and 1996. This does not, of course, eliminate the differences between the two countries in the extent and nature of reform.
To provide comparable estimates for a western country we construct a similar data set for Britain, matching workers over the Autumn 1996 and 1997 Labor Force Surveys, a period when Britain was three years into an economic recovery. All the samples cover anyone who classifies themselves as being in work and is not restricted to the population of working age, since, because of the transition process but also for historic reasons, we observe many individuals above statutory pensionable age in work. This gives us a total matched sample of around 7000 for Russia, 12000 for Poland and 27000 for Britain.
Job tenure information in all surveys is given in the form of the number of months and years that the worker has been continuously employed in the same establishment. For the Russian and British data, only the year in which the job started is recorded if the job began more than 8 years prior to the interview. We follow the recommendations of Brown and Light (1992) and ensure internal consistency across waves for the job tenure measures for the same individual for all job tenures 12 months and above. This, the authors argue, will tend to reduce the biases associated with measurement error of job tenure.
We identify a new job as one held by a worker who has been with the same employer for less than 12 months. Farber (1997) notes that this may mean that we over-sample more mobile workers and possibly low quality jobs if low quality jobs break up faster, though in a transition economy, this process of break up is exactly what we hope to measure. Nor do we identify net new jobs. Our definition encompasses hires made as a result of enterprise re-location, worker replacements as well as the creation of genuine new vacancies. However, this aggregate process is exactly the event we wish to examine.
Since there is no information on worker history between interviews, our mobility measures are based on observations 12 months apart. Having only 2 observation points makes it difficult for us to control for any unobserved worker/firm heterogeneity that may affect our results. The 12 month limit also does not allow us to distinguish between jobs that will eventually become good matches and those, which will end soon after. A job-to-job move is defined as one in which the worker was employed and at both observation points, but had job tenure less than 12 months when interviewed for the second time. Job separations are the sum of these job-to-job moves and moves from employment to non-employment between the two observation points. Neither measure captures whether the move was voluntary or otherwise, though anecdotal evidence from Russia suggests that firms may try to disguise layoffs in an attempt to avoid redundancy payments.
Nor can we apply continuous time methods of estimation to information gathered in this way.
Some studies (for example, Grogan and van den Berg, 1999, and Adamchik and King, 1999) The results for Russia will be affected by the presence of wage arrears. Lehmann, Wadsworth and Acquisti, (1999) show that between 40 and 60% of the workforce are affected by arrears. We choose not to remove those in arrears from the estimation but include instead a dummy variable for the presence of wage arrears in the Russian regressions. The existence of short-time working will also introduce additional measurement error into hourly wage estimates.
For these reasons we do not deflate wages by hours in what follows.
Our definition of the private sector includes the self-employed and those in privatized 6. Source: Russian Economic Trends firms together with those in new private firms, in the absence of any identifying information in the data sets. The wage data do, however, exclude the self-employed. Table 1 displays the job tenure distribution in the three countries in 1994 and 1996.
Separations
Around 14% of the Polish workforce are in new jobs, with tenure under one year, and about 19% of the Russian workforce. The latter is similar to both the British fraction and Farber's (1997) estimates for the United States. So, on this simple measure, the pace of re-allocation is not much faster in the transition economies. The Polish distribution has a large concentration of workers with tenure in excess of 20 years. Some of this is explained by the presence of private sector farming and the large share of agriculture in the Polish economy, (25%). When we remove agriculture, the fraction of these long-term jobs falls to 16%. Of these, 85% are in the state sector, against a state share of 65% in total employment. The Russian distribution does not look radically different from Western tenure profiles. Unlike in Britain, however, the rate of new hires is lower for women than men. The state sector (not shown) again accounts for a larger share of jobs with tenure in excess of 20 years, 63% against a total state employment share of 56%. The age distributions of the working populations in Poland and Russia are similar and are, therefore, unlikely to explain much of the difference in the tenure stocks.
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We now turn to job separations in order to examine the correlation between mobility and job tenure. Table 2 and Figure 1 outline the worker separation rate conditional on job tenure.
After the first year, the tenure-turnover profile for Russia is higher and flatter than that for Britain.
For Poland, however, there is evidence of a steeper, tenure-mobility profile than in either Russia or Britain, during the first 5 years on the job and a lower profile thereafter 8 . Most of these higher tenure workers will be employed in privatized or state firms. This could indicate that insider forces help shape the turnover process in Poland more than in Russia.
9
For Russia, this profile tails off after around ten years and remains at a much higher level throughout. In every country, more than one third of all new jobs end within two years, (row 1).
In Russia, one fifth of jobs that have lasted between two and five years will break up within the following year. Around one in six jobs in Poland or Britain will do so. Even after ten years, one in six Russian jobs break up, twice the Polish rate and seventy-five per cent higher than in Britain.
Note the job-to-job profiles for Poland and Russia lie generally below that of Britain. So the higher aggregate profile for Russia is driven by moves into non-employment.
The differences in the tenure profiles are reflected in the age-turnover profiles in the bottom panel of Table 2 10 . Turnover amongst Russian workers is much higher than in Britain at all levels of the age distribution beyond age 19. One quarter of Russian 30-34 year olds will separate from their jobs within a year, compared with one in 5 British and one in 6 Polish workers. Job-to-job moves continue at a near uniform rate in Russia between the ages of twentyfive and fifty, while the age-turnover profile for Poland falls with age and, as such, is similar to that of Britain 11 . Table 3 confirms that whilst mobility declines as experience and tenure grow, there remains a large degree of turnover in new jobs at all ages, (column 1) This is not however, confined to the transition economies. Turnover in new jobs held by British workers is also high 8 Unlike the tenure distribution, the Polish turnover data are not affected by the inclusion of agriculture. 9 Again, removal of the Polish agricultural sector does not much change the separation rates by age for those in the 5 year's tenure and over groups. 10 Mincer and Jovanovic (1981) show that the observed age turnover profile ds/dX = (δs/δT*dT/dX) + δs/δX where s is separations, T is tenure and X is experience. Convexity in the tenure profile, dT/dX, reinforces convexity in the age-turnover profile.
at all age levels. Mobility appears to fall with age at given tenures, in particular job-to-job moves.
These results are somewhat at odds with Mincer and Jovanovic's (1981) earlier findings for the U.S. that mobility does not decline at given tenure intervals across age groups.
State v. Private
We now examine differences in turnover patterns across the state and private sectors.
12 Table 4 and Figure 2 give the tenure-turnover profiles in the two sectors, together with the destination state of those who separate from their jobs. Separation rates in the state sector are higher in Russia than in Poland. Moreover the decline of turnover with tenure in Poland is much faster in the state sector than in Russia. This is consistent with the productivity differential and insider stories outlined in section 2. Separation rates from the private sector are, however, higher at all tenures under twenty years than in the state sector in all three countries. Whether the source of this differential lies with the behavior of the privatized or new private sectors cannot be elicited from the data. Private sector separation rates are highest in Russia. Given the dominance of the state sector in overall employment in the transition economies, this means that aggregate turnover in Russia is high, primarily because turnover in the state sector is relatively higher. Aggregate turnover in Poland is relatively low because the private sector in Poland accounts for a lower share of the workforce than in Britain.
Table A1 in the appendix shows fifty per cent of all separations in the Polish private sector and forty per cent in Russia are from jobs that have lasted less than one year. This is consistent with a higher incidence of job shopping and experience good sampling in the private sector.
Evidence also, perhaps, that the re-allocation process was more advanced in Poland is that there are more state-to-state moves in Russia. However the overall incidence of state-to-private sector 11 The Polish turnover results are changed little by the removal of agriculture. 12.
Ownership is self-assessed in every case.
moves is the same in both countries 13 . Table 5 attempts to establish whether these findings hold controlling for other factors. We present simple binary probit estimates of the probability that a worker will separate from a job within a year. The set of explanatory variables control for differences in gender, education, region, firm size and industry, together with age and job tenure. We present marginal effects alongside their standard errors, where the marginal effects give percentage point deviations scaled relative to the default tenure category, (ten years and over), with all other variables set to their sample means. The reference probabilities are given at the foot of the Table. The first column for each country reports the tenure profile in the absence of regression controls. The other columns include controls. The results from the cross tabulations are not overturned. Turnover declines with tenure, but, after the first year, the Polish and British profiles generally lie below the Russian one. When the data are split into the state and private sectors, (Table 6 ), the tenure-turnover profiles observed in Table 4 remain robust to the inclusion of controls. Turnover in the Russian state sector is higher than turnover in the Polish state sector at all tenures greater than one year.
Tables A3-A5 in the appendix, present marginal effects from multinomial logit estimates of the likelihood that a worker in employment will stay in the same job, move between jobs or move into non-employment over the 12 month observation interval, in order to see whether tenure effects differ according to the destination state. In Poland (and Britain), the job-to-job turnover effects are smaller than the tenure profiles determining moves into non-employment. In Russia, the opposite pattern is observed. In all countries, moves into non-employment are more likely to be experienced by the under 25s and those approaching retirement age 14 . The age effects on mobility are also larger for Russia.
13 Table A2 in the appendix documents the shares of new hires from employment and non-employment.
New Jobs
We now examine the pattern of new job creation in the transition economies, focusing on the characteristics of the workers hired and the relative pay in these new jobs, as a proxy for their quality. Table 7 undertakes a simple steady state exercise to establish the likely number of new jobs a worker can expect to hold over the working lifetime, if current worker turnover patterns were to persist. Following Hall (1982) , we calculate the flow of new job matches across age categories and use this to estimate the number of new jobs held in each age group. In a steady state, the annual number of new jobs is twice the fraction with job tenure of 6 months or less. The number of jobs held over a five year period is then five times this annual rate and the expected number of lifetime jobs is the sum over the entire working age range. Using 1996 as the base, the average Polish worker could expect to hold around 12 jobs over the life cycle and the average Russian worker 13 jobs, if current conditions persist. Two thirds of these jobs are held before the age of 30 and reflect the large degree of turnover observed amongst younger workers. This also explains the higher number of total number of jobs for both countries compared to Britain. of the new job stock disappears within another year in both countries. Job survival rates are higher in the state sector. Around 44% of Polish state sector jobs survive for at least two years and only 30% of private sector jobs. In Russia, the respective two-year survival rates are 56% and 39%. These results may, of course, be influenced by any heterogeneity in the quality of the job match that could also generate an upward sloping wage-tenure profile. See Altonji and Shakotko (1987) and Topel (1991) for ways of dealing with this issue, which cannot be implemented given the limited longitudinal information in our data sets. 17 Removal of industry dummies makes little difference to the state level and interaction terms in any country.
Conclusions
It seems that there is an inverse tenure-turnover profile in both transition countries, which is higher in Russia than in Poland. Turnover is higher in the private sector at all tenures than in state sector firms, but turnover in the Russian state sector is relatively high and this explains why the aggregate turnover profile in Russia lies above that of Poland (and Britain). Since most workers with tenure greater than five years will be in privatized rather than new private sector firms, it appears that privatized firms are shedding labor faster than state firms. However less than one fifth of workers leaving a state sector job are in private sector work one year later. The pace of new job creation is higher in the private sector, but the chance of private sector jobs lasting two years are only half that of a new state sector job. Whilst we do find that separation rates are larger at any given tenure level in Russia than in a Western economy toward the flexible end of the labor market, there is no evidence to suggest that this also holds for Poland. This seems difficult to square with a simple story of accelerated depreciation of firm-specific capital acquired before transition. Insider forces may then be helping shape worker turnover in Poland more than in Russia. We find little difference in the characteristics of those hired in the state and private sectors during transition. The demands of firms re-structuring and those involved in the re-allocation of labor appear to be similar. We do however find evidence in Russia, that job tenure does little to explain wage levels, whereas the earnings differential between new and existing jobs in Poland is of a similar magnitude to those observed in the West. This may be because the labor market transition process in Poland has been less volatile and smoother than in Russia, where uncertainty looks set to dominate over the next few years. Note: see Table 5 . Hetroskedastic adjusted standard errors in brackets. Regressions also contain 9 regional dummies, 5 firm size and 8 industry dummies. F Test is for validity of sample split into state and private. industry dummies a year dummy and a control for the presence of wage arrears. Hetroskedastic adjusted standard errors in brackets. Regressions also contain 9 regional dummies, 5 firm size and 8 industry dummies. .5
